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The Journalist-Source Privilege in
Quebec Civil Law: Globe and Mail v.
Canada (Attorney General)
Christian Leblanc, Marc-André Nadon and
Émilie Forgues-Bundock∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Investigative journalism plays an important role in the preservation
of democracy. In fact, the press has often been regarded and referred to
as the “watchdog of democracy”. Behind reporters there are often
anonymous sources, people who are not authorized to disclose certain
information or documents to the press. History has shown that, in many
cases, these sources are essential to the uncovering and reporting of
matters of public interest such as the Watergate scandal during the 1970s
and the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior in 1985.1
More recently in Quebec, investigative journalism has brought to
light flaws in municipal governments as well as questionable practices in
the construction industry. Leading this wave of reports, the affair best
known as the “Sponsorship Scandal” rocked the political and media
landscape in Canada and confirmed the importance of investigative
journalism in a free and democratic society. The leaking of confidential
information to a reporter by anonymous sources had prompted then
Prime Minister Paul Martin to order a public inquiry into the Sponsorship Program set up by the federal cabinet following the 1995 referendum on Quebec’s sovereignty.
It is in this context that the Supreme Court of Canada has examined
the journalist-source privilege in Quebec civil law. In Globe and Mail v.

∗
Christian Leblanc is a partner at Fasken Martineau; Marc-André Nadon is a lawyer at
Fasken Martineau; Émilie Forgues-Bundock is a law student at Fasken Martineau.
1
Gesca ltée c. Groupe Polygone Éditeurs inc. (Malcom Média inc.), [2009] J.Q. no 8151,
2009 QCCA 1534, at para. 86 (Que. C.A.); see also R. v. National Post, [2004] O.J. No. 178, 69
O.R. (3d) 427, at para. 47 (Ont. S.C.J.); quashed, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477 (S.C.C.)
(but not on this point) for other examples of journalistic reporting based on confidential sources.
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Canada (Attorney General),2 the country’s highest court confirmed the
mixed (civil law and common law) nature of Quebec’s civil procedure
and evidence law and established an analytical framework to determine
in which circumstances a journalist-source privilege will be recognized,
reaffirming at the same time the essential role played by the media in the
preservation of democracy.
This article analyzes the recognition of the journalist-source privilege in Quebec. Most jurisdictions offer some protection to journalistsource relationships; however, not all of them implemented the same
model of protection. In order to better understand the context of this
recognition, we begin with an overview of the law in a few foreign
jurisdictions. Such an exercise gives us an opportunity to better situate
the protection Canadian journalists now enjoy under the Court’s decision
in Globe and Mail.
The complexity of this makes it unique and therefore worth looking
at in more depth. The first difficulty that the Supreme Court of Canada
faced was its own refusal to recognize a constitutionally entrenched
privilege in National Post a few months ago. The second hurdle for the
Supreme Court of Canada was the absence of a specific statutory
provision that could incorporate a journalist-source privilege in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 or the Quebec Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms.4 The last and not least challenge for the
Supreme Court of Canada was to reconcile the common law with the
interpretation of the Civil Code of Quebec5 in order to apply a common
law doctrine to Quebec civil cases.
In order to present a more in-depth analysis, this article will not deal
with the validity of the publication ban, which was nonetheless a very
important issue in this case. This article does not provide an exhaustive
list of the circumstances that could require a journalist to disclose the
identity of his or her source. Its purpose is to present the law in Quebec
on the recognition of the journalist-source privilege in a civil case, as
clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Globe and Mail.

2
[2010] S.C.J. No. 41, 2010 SCC 41, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 592 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Globe
and Mail”].
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Canadian Charter”].
4
R.S.Q. c. C-12 [hereinafter “Quebec Charter”].
5
S.Q. 1991, c. 64 [hereinafter “Civil Code”].
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II. FOREIGN LAW
Most jurisdictions offer some protection to journalist-source relationships; however, not all of them implemented the same model of protection. Among the available models, we selected examples that show the
three main trends, namely: (1) a constitutionally entrenched privilege
(Europe and the United Kingdom); (2) a specific statutory protection
(American states, the United Kingdom and Australia to a certain extent);
and (3) an implicit protection derived from the common law (as used to
be the case in Australia).
1. European Union
Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms recognizes the journalist-source privilege:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.6

Any order forcing a reporter to reveal the identity of a source in connection with a legal proceeding is prima facie a breach of a fundamental
right. In Goodwin v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human
Rights held that the journalist-source privilege outweighed a company’s
interests in protecting confidential information related to the preparation
of its financial statements.7 In November 1989, Tetra Ltd. was experiencing serious financial problems due to major losses which, some believed,
6
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (November
4, 1950), 213 R.T.N.U. 221, S.T.E. 5, art. 10 [hereinafter “European Human Rights Convention”].
7
Goodwin v. United Kingdom (1996), 22 E.H.H.R. 123 [hereinafter “Goodwin”]. See also
Ernst v. Belgium (2004), 39 E.H.R.R. 35.
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could have been avoided. The company was about to take out a loan to
offset a loss when confidential documents describing the situation were
stolen and then given to a reporter from The Engineer magazine. Informed of the leak of information and the theft of the documents, Tetra
Ltd. applied for and obtained an injunction to prevent publication of the
article and any information related to the stolen confidential documents.
In resolving this matter, the European Court of Human Rights reviewed the applicable analytical framework to determine whether the
setting aside of the journalist-source privilege is justified in a specific
case. Referring to article 10(2) of the European Human Rights Convention, the Court noted that it was in the interest of a free and democratic
society that freedom of the press be protected.8 To do so, a balance
between competing interests must be sought, namely, those of Tetra Ltd.
to prevent the damage it could incur due to the loss of investors’ confidence and to seek legal action against the person who leaked the confidential documents, and those of a free and democratic society in securing
a free press.9 The Court held that, although the goal of the order was
laudable, compelling the reporter to disclose the identity of his source
was not an appropriate means of achieving it.10 The undermining of
freedom of the press was too great and it was not necessary to protect
Tetra’s rights under English law, despite the discretion member States
enjoy in applying the European Human Rights Convention in their
jurisdiction.11
2. United Kingdom
As a party to the European Human Rights Convention, the United
Kingdom recognizes the existence of a journalist-source privilege as set
out in article 10 of the European Human Rights Convention, a principle
also found in English law in article 10 of the Contempt of Court Act
1981:
No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of
contempt of court for refusing to disclose the source of information
contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be
established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in
8
9
10
11

Id., at paras. 39-40.
Id., at para. 45.
Id., at para. 46.
Id.
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the interest of justice or national security or for the prevention of
disorder or crime.12

Article 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates article 10 of the
European Human Rights Convention word for word.13 Ashworth Security
Hospital v. MGN Ltd.14 clarified the effect of incorporating this article
into domestic English law.15 In doing so, the House of Lords reiterated
the importance of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the
journalist-source privilege in a free and democratic society.16 According
to the House of Lords, there is no doubt that this right includes the
freedom to receive or communicate information or ideas without interference by public authorities, subject to certain exceptions in particular
circumstances.17
The facts of that case stem from the highly publicized story of the
serial killer Ian Brady, who was arrested for heinous murders committed
in the Greater Manchester area in England during the 1960s.18 Mr. Brady
was declared criminally insane in 1985. Incarcerated, he said several
times, through the media, that he did not wish to be released but that he
claimed at least the right to die. He went on a hunger strike. In its
December 2, 2009 issue, the Daily Mirror published an article that
contained extracts of Mr. Brady’s medical records when he was detained
at the Ashworth hospital. In exchange for the sum of £1,500, the Daily
Mirror had obtained this information from a secret intermediary source,
who had obtained it from a good source, probably someone working at
the hospital. In connection with legal proceedings related to Mr. Brady’s
mental health, the Court ordered the Daily Mirror to testify as to how it
had obtained the medical file and identify any person who had participated in collecting the information. The disclosure of the identity of the
intermediary source by the newspaper would clearly have allowed the
main source at the establishment to be identified. The Daily Mirror
therefore objected to the order.
According to the House of Lords, a privilege for journalists’ sources
is an essential aspect of freedom of expression and freedom of the press:

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Contempt of Court Act 1981 (U.K.), 1981, c. 49.
Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42, Schedule 1, Part I, art. 10.
[2002] U.K.H.L. 29 [hereinafter “Ashworth”].
Id., at paras. 37-40.
Id., at paras. 37-38.
Id., at para. 37.
These killings are commonly referred to as the “Moors murders”.
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The fact is that information which should be placed in the public
domain is frequently made available to the press by individuals who
would lack the courage to provide the information if they thought there
was a risk of their identity being disclosed. The fact that journalists’
sources can be reasonably confident that their identity will not be
disclosed makes a significant contribution to the ability of the press to
perform their role in society of making information available to the
public. It is for this reason that it is well established now that the courts
will normally protect journalists’ sources from identification.19

Accordingly, the House of Lords reiterated the risks of an order forcing a
reporter to disclose the identity of his or her source, namely it would
discourage certain sources from confiding in reporters and thus jeopardize to a certain extent freedom of expression, freedom of the press and
the public’s right to information.20 However, the House of Lords recognized that the journalist-source privilege cannot be absolute, and that
circumstances may, according to the context, justify the disclosure of the
identity of a confidential source.21 In the Ashworth case, their lordships
were of the view that an order of disclosure was necessary, proportionate
and justified. The care of patients in this particular situation was already
a challenge and was aggravated by the disclosure of confidential information.22 The “pressing social need” in this case was to preserve the
confidentiality of patients’ notes and records, thus guaranteeing the
relationship of fundamental trust between therapists and patients.23
In conclusion, in the United Kingdom, there is a journalistic privilege recognized as a corollary of freedom of expression, which may
nonetheless be set aside in certain circumstances following an analysis
which takes into account particular circumstances of each situation.
3. United States
No provision of the U.S. Constitution recognizes a journalist-source
privilege that would prevent a reporter from being compelled to disclose
the identity of a secret source. However, the United States Supreme

19
20
21
22
23

Ashworth, supra, note 14, at para. 61.
This is what the courts generally refer to as the “chilling effect”.
Supra, note 14, at para. 61.
Id., at para. 63.
Id., at paras. 62-63.
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Court considered recognizing a journalist-source privilege under the U.S.
Constitution in connection with a criminal trial in Branzburg v. Hayes.24
Branzburg v. Hayes dealt with the publication of two articles in the
Courier-Journal. On November 15, 1969, the Courier-Journal published
an article by Paul Branzburg in which the reporter described in great
detail a scene he had witnessed himself, the manufacturing of hashish
from marijuana by two residents of Jefferson County. The article was
accompanied by a photograph showing a pair of hands holding the illegal
substance. According to the article, the two protagonists earned approximately $5,000 in three weeks from this business. It also said that the
reporter had promised to maintain the anonymity of the people he met for
the purpose of the article. The second article, published on January 10,
1971, was a summary of the reporter’s observations during the two
weeks he had spent visiting drug addicts in Kentucky. The reporter was
called to testify before the Jefferson County grand jury, which was set up
to discover who had committed the crimes he had reported about. The
reporter refused to identify those associated directly or indirectly with his
articles under the First Amendment, which explicitly guarantees freedom
of speech and freedom of the press.25
The Court refused to recognize a First Amendment privilege that
would allow a reporter to refuse to answer a question that could identify
a secret source, unless the legal process is tainted by bad faith.26 The
Court held that the public interest in adjudicating crimes outweighs the
need for reporters to guarantee the confidentiality of relationships with
their sources, even when it undermines freedom of the press. The U.S.
Supreme Court also held that nothing prevents a state legislature from
fashioning its own standards and rules to deal with the journalist-source
privilege.27
Recognizing both the importance of promoting free speech and freedom of the press, and that freedom of the press includes the freedom to
gather information without disruption, 33 American states as well as the
District of Columbia have enacted “shield laws” setting out a reporter’s
privilege that protects the relationship between a reporter and his or her
24

408 U.S. 665 (1972) [hereinafter “Branzburg”].
U.S. Const. Amend. I : “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”
26
Branzburg, supra, note 24, at 707.
27
Id., at 706.
25
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source and sometimes extends to the very protection of the information
communicated.28 In 16 other states, the case law recognizes such a
privilege.29 Only Wyoming has not ruled on this issue so far.30
4. Australia
There is no provision enacting a journalist-source privilege in An Act
to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia.31 Such privilege is,
however, codified in the Evidence Act 199532 and this codification
reflects the recognition of a journalist-source privilege by the courts.
Before the codification of the journalist-source privilege, in The
Commonwealth of Australia v. John Fairfax and Sons Ltd.,33 the High
Court of Australia quashed an injunction aimed at preventing the publication of a controversial book in which the authors had reproduced extracts
of confidential government documents concerning the country’s defence
and foreign policy from 1968 to 1975. The book’s editors had agreed
with two newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, on the
publication of a series of articles presenting extracts of the book for
promotional purposes. The confidential documents examined included,
among other things, memos, studies and reports about the East Timor
crisis, the negotiations surrounding the establishment of American bases
on Australian territory, Australia’s support of the Shah of Iran, security at
the Butterworth base in Malaysia, information about the British and
American secret service and the military alliance between Australia, New
Zealand and the United States (the A.N.Z.U.S. Treaty).
Although the publication of this information represented at first
glance a risk to the country’s national security, the High Court of Austra28
U.S., Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Journalists’ Privilege to
Withhold Information in Judicial and Other Proceedings: State Shield Statutes (Order Code RL32806),
updated June 27, 2007 (by Henry Cohen, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division) [hereinafter
“CRS Report”]. The 33 states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee and
Washington. See also Kathleen Ann Ruan, Legislative Attorney, Journalists’ Privilege: Overview of the
Law and Legislation in Recent Congresses (January 19, 2011).
29
CRS Report, id., at CRS-1 (Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and
Wisconsin).
30
CRS Report, id., at CRS-1.
31
(July 9, 1900) (Cth.).
32
Evidence Act 1995 (Act No. 2 of 1995), art. 126Aff.
33
(1980), 147 C.L.R. 39 [herinafter “Australia v. John Fairfax and Sons Ltd.”].
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lia found nothing in the book that would justify restraining freedom of
the press. Despite the security code in the classification of the documents, the Court noted that the extracts presented in the book did not
disclose any information about military techniques or technology or the
weapons, logistics or organization of the Australian or foreign armed
forces.34 Accordingly, although the publication of certain extracts could
be embarrassing for the Australian government and said publication
might put a damper on diplomatic relations involving the sharing of
military information or foreign affairs, the country’s national security
was not jeopardized.35 Also, as copies of the book had already been
distributed in Indonesia and the United States, an injunction would not
have prevented the alleged harm in the two countries that were the most
targeted by the contents of the book and newspaper articles. The Court
therefore held that restraining freedom of the press was not warranted.
Now that we have completed our overview, we turn to the issue of
the protection of journalistic sources in Canada and, more specifically, in
Quebec.

III. THE MIXED ORIGINS OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN QUEBEC
LAW: CONTROVERSY OVER THE EXISTENCE OF A JOURNALISTSOURCE PRIVILEGE PRIOR TO THE GLOBE AND MAIL CASE
The origin of the debate surrounding the recognition of the journalist-source privilege in civil law lies in the cultural particularities of
Quebec law, namely, the mixed nature of its sources. Professor Daniel
Jutras describes Quebec’s legal culture as follows:
In Quebec, the political culture of litigation and its economy is
undeniably North American. Today it fits in somewhat uncomfortably
between, on the one hand, the culture of legal protagonist, which is
found in the realm of common law, and, on the other hand, a normative
culture which affirms that sources of Quebec’s civil procedure are
associated with the civil law tradition.36

The issue of whether the common law plays a suppletive role in Quebec
civil law was at the heart of the debates surrounding the recognition of a
journalist-source privilege in Quebec. Although article 1206 of the
34

Id., at para. 10.
Id., at paras. 35-37.
Daniel Jutras, “Culture et droit processuel : le cas du Québec” (2009) R.D. McGill 273, at
278 (translation).
35
36
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former Civil Code of Lower Canada37 explicitly allowed Québec judges,
in commercial matters, to resort to common law rules and principles of
evidence when there was otherwise no applicable Quebec provision on
point, the Civil Code of Quebec did not reproduce this provision or
anything like it.38 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada had previously held that the Civil Code constitutes in and of itself a set of complete and autonomous rules and that systematically importing common
law principles should be avoided.39 Thus, since the Civil Code came into
force, there has been uncertainty as to whether the common law can be
used to fill a legal void in Quebec civil law. Both the doctrine and
Quebec courts have examined this issue, without providing a clear
answer. The case law in recent years shows that courts may be leaning,
more receptively, to foreign sources. Indeed, the growing influence of
cross-border sources on civil procedure and evidence law is notable in
the common law provinces, Quebec and Canada.
In Wightman v. Widdrington,40 the Quebec Court of Appeal noted the
common law’s influence on Quebec’s civil procedure, particularly when
the Code of Civil Procedure41 does not provide a solution to the issue and
Quebec courts have not ruled on it. Writing for the Court, the Honourable
Yves-Marie Morissette stated as follows:
No judgment published in Quebec involves facts similar to those which
gave rise to the application for disqualification in the Superior Court. It
is therefore up to the Court to examine Canadian and foreign
jurisprudence on this issue. Although the jurisprudence from these
other legal systems should be followed with caution, it is nonetheless
relevant when the applicable fundamental principles are substantially
the same as those admitted in Quebec law.42

What we see from this brief review of case law is essentially what
the Supreme Court of Canada held in Lac d’Amiante du Québec Ltée v.

37

1866 (C.C.L.C.).
Globe and Mail, supra, note 2, at para. 41.
39
Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, [2002] S.C.J. No. 86, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 663 (S.C.C.), where
LeBel J. held that libel cases should be analyzed and decided based on the Civil Code of Quebec and
civil liability in conjunction with the Charters, and that the fair comment defence should not be
applied mechanically in civil law, but aspects of it may be considered in analyzing fault.
40
Wightman v. Widdrington (Succession de), [2007] J.Q. no 13704, [2008] R.J.Q. 59 (Que.
C.A.) [hereinafter “Wightman v. Widdrington”].
41
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25 [hereinafter “C.C.P.”].
42
Supra, note 40, at para. 58 (translation).
38
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2858-0702 Québec Inc.43 regarding the mixed sources of Quebec private
law. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to determine
whether or not there was an implied rule of confidentiality under Quebec
civil law. After a thorough review of the evolution of the rules relating to
examinations on discovery in Quebec law, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that, although no provision of the C.C.P. expressly provided for it,
such a rule:
may … be found in Quebec procedural law, based on the changes that
have taken place in the institutions of the civil procedure and on
privacy principles. The rule of confidentiality, the effects of which are
analogous to the principles developed by the common law, may be
recognized in Quebec in accordance with the techniques of civil law
analysis, based on the fundamental principles around which the civil
law and judicial procedure are organized.44

Thus, although it is not always advisable to import a common law rule
into civil law, common law rules may nonetheless influence the analysis
of a question to which the C.C.P. does not seem to provide a clear
answer. Furthermore, we note that, in several respects, the rules of
Quebec civil procedure and evidence are similar to those of the other
Canadian provinces as the civil law and common law traditions share
certain fundamental principles.45

IV. STRIVING FOR A LEGAL FOUNDATION SUPPORTING
THE RECOGNITION OF A JOURNALIST-SOURCE PRIVILEGE IN
QUEBEC CIVIL LAW
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
In the absence of a provision that explicitly recognizes the journalistsource privilege, we should determine whether the recognition of such a
privilege can be inferred from other constitutional provisions.
Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter entrenches freedom of expression:
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
.....
43
[2001] S.C.J. No. 49, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 743, 2001 SCC 51 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lac
d’Amiante”].
44
Id., at para. 79 (emphasis added).
45
Id., at paras. 56-61, 78.
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(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication; …

Significantly, LaForest J. noted in Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
v. Lessard that section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter, which recognizes
freedom of expression and its corollary, freedom of the press, also covers
the right to gather news without disruption.46
In R. v. National Post,47 the Supreme Court rejected the position of
the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the British Columbia Civil
Liberties Association built on the premise that protection of confidential
sources should be treated as if it were encompassed in the Canadian
Charter, as a corollary of section 2(b). Drawing an analogy to solicitorclient privilege, the Supreme Court stated that, even though solicitorclient privilege is supported by and impressed with the values underlying
section 7 of the Canadian Charter, it is generally seen as a “fundamental
and substantive rule of law” rather than as “constitutional”.48
Referring to one of its recent decisions, the Supreme Court stated
that freedom of expression is not limited to the traditional media, but is
enjoyed by “everyone” (using the term in section 2(b) of the Canadian
Charter) who chooses to exercise his or her freedom of expression on
matters of public interest, whether by blogging, tweeting, standing on a
street corner and shouting the “news”, reporting, or any other means.49
The Supreme Court found that this group of writers and speakers is too
heterogeneous to offer constitutional immunity for communications
between its members and “sources” who are promised confidentiality,
since such immunity would significantly undermine law enforcement and
other constitutionally recognized values such as the right to privacy.50
According to the Supreme Court, it is very possible and desirable to
provide solid protection from the compelled disclosure of secret source
identities without recognizing a general constitutional immunity for this
type of communication.51
It should be noted that the Court’s decision in R. v. National Post was
rendered before the decision at the heart of this article. For some, R. v.
46
47
48

(S.C.C.).

[1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421 (S.C.C.).
[2010] S.C.J. No. 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477, at para. 38 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 39; R. v. McClure, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, at para. 17

49
R. v. National Post, id., at para. 40; Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, [2009]
3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
50
R. v. National Post, id., at para. 40.
51
Id., at para. 41.
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National Post predicted how the Court would rule on the issue of the
privilege of journalists’ sources in the Globe and Mail case. However, it
is important not to lose sight of the particular legal context of the
National Post case. There, the Court was concerned with the production
of documents or other evidence in connection with a criminal investigation in a common law province. The scope of that case is therefore
limited and only applies when a reporter has material evidence necessary
to prove the existence of a crime. In that case, the Supreme Court held
that a journalist’s refusal to turn over such material evidence on the
grounds that it could reveal the identity of a confidential source was not
justified, at least in the case of serious crimes. The Globe and Mail case
raised a different issue, which was whether a journalist-source privilege
should be recognized in Quebec civil law in connection with a commercial dispute.
2. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms
In the absence of a provision in the Quebec Charter that explicitly
recognizes the journalist-source privilege, it is appropriate to examine the
scope of other provisions of the Quebec Charter that could give the status
of quasi-constitutional privilege to the confidentiality of journalistic
sources in Quebec.
Section 3 of the Quebec Charter is the equivalent of section 2(b) of
the Canadian Charter:
3. Every person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms,
including freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of
opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and
freedom of association.

Given the resemblance between these provisions and the decision in R. v.
National Post, it would have been difficult for the Court to recognize a
quasi-constitutional journalist-source privilege in Quebec pursuant to
section 3 of the Quebec Charter.
Section 9 of the Quebec Charter protects professional secrecy:
9. Every person has a right to non-disclosure of confidential
information.
No person bound to professional secrecy by law and no priest or other
minister of religion may, even in judicial proceedings, disclose
confidential information revealed to him by reason of his position or
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profession, unless he is authorized to do so by the person who confided
such information to him or by an express provision of law.
The tribunal must, ex officio, ensure that professional secrecy is
respected.

According to several authors, professional secrecy only applies to
professionals who have a statutory duty to respect it, and its application
is limited to professional bodies governed by the Professional Code,52
which does not cover the profession of reporter. The legislator had
considered including the profession of reporter in the list of professional
bodies governed by the law when the Professional Code was adopted
but, in the end, the National Assembly rejected this proposal.53
Contrary to the Canadian Charter, which does not explicitly recognize a right to information, section 44 of the Quebec Charter clearly
provides that “[e]very person has a right to information to the extent
provided by law”. However, the Supreme Court stated that the rights set
out in Chapter IV entitled “Economic and Social Rights”, including
section 44 of the Quebec Charter:
are limited in such a way as to put the specific legislative measures or
framework adopted by the legislature beyond the reach of judicial
review. These provisions require the state to take steps to make the
Chapter IV rights effective, but they do not allow for the judicial
assessment of the adequacy of those steps.54

Thus, the Quebec Charter recognizes a positive right to information,
worded in limited terms, the scope of which seems rather restrictive.
3. The “Wigmore Doctrine” Applied to the Journalist-Source
Privilege in R. v. National Post
Professor John Henry Wigmore, an author highly recognized in
common law for his doctrine on the law of evidence, developed a
methodology that would recognize certain relationships as privileged, on
52
R.S.Q., c. C-26, Sch. I. See also Office des professions du Québec, “Ordres professionnels”, online: <http://www.opq.gouv.qc.ca/ordres-professionnels> (in French only). See also N.
Vallières, “Le secret professionnel inscrit dans la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne du
Québec” (1985) 26 C. de D. 1019, at 1022-23. See also Léo Ducharme, L’administration de la
preuve, 3d ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2001), at 94.
53
Québec, Journal des débats : Commissions parlementaires, 3d Sess., 30th Leg., No. 6
(January 22, 1975), at B-322.
54
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at
para. 92 (S.C.C.).
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a case-by-case basis.55 Although at the time Professor Wigmore was not a
supporter of a privilege for secret sources, the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a journalist-source privilege by applying the
“Wigmore Doctrine” to communications between a reporter and his or
her secret source in R. v. National Post.56
The origins of R. v. National Post lie in what is better known today
as “Shawinigate”. The appellant Andrew McIntosh, a journalist at the
National Post (“National Post”), took an interest in then Prime Minister
Jean Chrétien’s involvement with the Grand-Mère Golf Club located in
Mr. Chrétien’s home riding of St-Maurice, Québec. A few years later, at
the National Post, Mr. McIntosh received a sealed plain brown envelope
that contained a document that appeared to be a copy of a Business
Development Bank of Canada (“BDBC”) internal loan authorization for
a $615,000 mortgage to Auberge Grand-Mère. Mr. McIntosh forwarded
the document to the Prime Minister’s Office, the Prime Minister’s legal
counsel, and the BDBC to assess their validity. All claimed the document
was a forgery. Following a complaint from the BDBC, the RCMP met
with Mr. McIntosh, who declined to identify his source. Mr. McIntosh
told the RCMP, however, that the document and envelope were kept at
the National Post. The RCMP applied to the Ontario Court of Justice for
a warrant and assistance order stating that the evidence it wished to seize
was not available from any other source. The RCMP intended to submit
the document and envelope for forensic testing to determine if they
contained anything that could help to identify the source. Mr. McIntosh
and the National Post applied to quash the warrant and assistance order.
The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that, although journalists’
sources should receive evidentiary protection in a criminal investigative
process, the judicial search for truth outweighed the protection of the
journalist’s source in this case. By extending the application of the
“Wigmore Doctrine” to that case, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that the role of investigative journalism has expanded over
the years to help fill what has been described as a democratic deficit in
the transparency and accountability of our public institutions, and the
need to respect journalist-source confidentiality in certain specific
circumstances to ensure the vitality of investigative journalism.57
55
Edward J. Imwinkelried, dir., The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence — Evidentiary
Privileges (Austin: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, Aspen Publishers, 2011).
56
Supra, note 48.
57
Id., at paras. 54-55.
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The “Wigmore Doctrine” consists of four elements which the Supreme Court of Canada restated in the particular context of journalists’
sources as follows: (1) the communication must originate in a confidence
that the identity of the informant will not be disclosed; (2) the confidence
must be essential to the relationship in which the communication arises;
(3) the relationship must be one which should be “sedulously fostered” in
the public good; and (4) if all of these requirements are met, the court
must consider whether in the instant case the public interest served by
protecting the identity of the informant from disclosure outweighs the
public interest in getting at the truth.58
In R. v. National Post, the Supreme Court refused to recognize that
journalist-source protection falls within the grasp of section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter, which is a conclusion that constitutes a significant
ruling in and of itself. However, the facts and context of R. v. National
Post prevents the decision from standing out as a complete precedent on
the question of journalists’ sources in Canada. R. v. National Post
involved the production of documents in a criminal investigative process,
and did not raise any issue about the interaction of the common law and
civil law. Therefore that decision has limited value as precedent in other
cases of journalist-source privilege in Canada. As we will see, Globe and
Mail continued the analysis that began in R. v. National Post.
(a) Application of the “Wigmore Doctrine” in Quebec Civil Law:
A Doctrinal Debate
Professors Léo Ducharme and Jean-Claude Royer adopted diametrically opposed views of the influence of the common law on Quebec law
of evidence and civil procedure since the Civil Code came into force.
Both view differently the effect of the disappearance of the legislative
provision codifying the suppletive role of common law rules in Quebec
civil law.
Professor Ducharme argues that, in the case of a fact which occurred
after the Civil Code came into force, “the coming into force of the Code
had the effect of repealing the former French and English laws as
suppletive law regarding evidence”.59

58

Id., at para. 53.
Léo Ducharme, Précis de la preuve, 5th ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2005), at 17
(translation).
59
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However, according to Professor Royer’s thesis, the legislator’s failure to include a provision similar to article 1206 of the C.C.L.C. in the
Civil Code does not change the fact that French law and common law
remain the foundations of the Civil Code.60 Accordingly, there is nothing
to prevent the use of common law rules to interpret Quebec civil law.
Professor Royer adds, regarding the rules concerning investigations and
testimonial evidence, that
[m]ost of these rules stem from the common law. As a result, English
law should generally be used to interpret it. Furthermore, the legislator
did not adopt a code of civil procedure which includes a complete and
exhaustive enumeration of all the rules relating to evidence and the
administration of evidence. This could justify the maintaining of certain
common law privileges, which are related to the accusatorial and
contradictory nature of a trial, even if they are not formally recognized
in the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.61

On the more specific issue of privileges recognized in common law,
Professor Royer notes that several privileges created by common law
were introduced into Quebec civil law.62 Still, the courts have sometimes
refused to use common law rules to make up for a certain deficiency in
Quebec law, causing the uncertainty to continue. Professor Royer
believes that the common law will continue to influence the interpretation of certain rules codified in Quebec law that stem from the common
law.63 Regarding the issue of whether the common law could be used to
justify a privilege not explicitly recognized in a legal text, he says “the
power of the courts to rule outside of written codes and legislation, when
deficiencies appear, is still much more limited in the civil law tradition
than in the common law”.64
(b) Application of the “Wigmore Doctrine” in Quebec Civil Law:
a Jurisprudential Debate
When they have not applied the “Wigmore Doctrine”, the courts
have generally based their reasoning on the Civil Code and the applicable rights guaranteed by the Quebec Charter, given the nature of the
60
Jean-Claude Royer & Sophie Lavallée, La preuve civile, 4th ed. (Cowansville, Que.,
Yvon Blais, 2008) at 73 [hereinafter “La preuve civile”].
61
Id., at 74 (translation) (emphasis added).
62
Id., at 1042.
63
Id., at 1043 (translation).
64
Lac d’Amiante, supra, note 43, at para. 39 (translation).
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case.65 Although refusing to turn to the “Wigmore Doctrine” to support
their analysis, Quebec courts are not diametrically opposed to recognizing a journalist-source privilege, as witnessed by this extract of Biron J.’s
reasons in Jacques Drouin v. La Presse:
In short, although the information sought may be interesting, it is not
necessary to maintain the fairness of the trial. It appears, in the final
analysis, that only freedom of the press would lose, without the
Plaintiff gaining anything. Our legal system is based on the search for
the truth but it should not be overly curious.66

Quebec courts have therefore dismissed an application for the disclosure
of a reporter’s source a few times, without referring to the “Wigmore
Doctrine”. This was the case in Centre de réadaptation en déficience
intellectuelle de Québec v. Groupe TVA Inc.67 when the Superior Court
had to determine whether or not it should allow the application of the
plaintiff, which requested the name of a reporter’s source. During a news
story, reporter Nicolas Vigneault had questioned the source of reporter
Pierre Jobin about the plaintiff’s mission to take charge of and socially
integrate approximately 100 people who were still at the public establishment due to mental impairment. Rather than use the “Wigmore
Doctrine”, the Court weighed the two fundamental rights of the parties,
namely, “[f]irstly, freedom of expression which covers freedom of the
press and the public’s right to information and, secondly, the right of all
citizens to put forward all their grounds of defence during a hearing
before an independent court.”68 The Court also held that the plaintiff
could exercise its right without having to know the identity of the
source.69 Regarding the consequences of such a decision on the plaintiff
imposing disciplinary measures on the source, the Court held that it was
minimal compared to what the reporter Pierre Jobin would suffer if he
were forced to identify his source. Such an order could irrevocably affect
Mr. Jobin’s ability to obtain information from a confidential source in
the future.70
65
See in particular, Grenier v. Arthur, [2001] J.Q. no 1170, [2001] R.J.Q. 674 (Que. S.C.);
Centre de réadaptation en déficience intellectuelle de Québec v. Groupe TVA inc., [2005] J.Q. no
9932, [2005] R.J.Q. 2327, and Jacques Drouin v. La Presse ltée, [1999] J.Q. no 6398, [1999] R.J.Q.
3023 (Que. S.C.).
66
Jacques Drouin v. La Presse Ltée, id., at 3030.
67
[2005] J.Q. no 9932, [2005] R.J.Q. 2327 (Que. S.C.) [hereinafter “C.R.D.I.Q. v. Groupe
TVA”].
68
Id., at para. 113 (translation).
69
Id., at para. 114.
70
Id., at paras. 115-116.
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In Tremblay v. Hamilton,71 the Superior Court applied the “Wigmore
Doctrine” and recognized a privilege by assessing the particular circumstances of the situation. The Court also noted that
the particular role of the press, the importance of freedom of the press
guaranteed in section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms as well as the requirement set out in Article 2858 of the Civil
Code of Québec should be weighed with a view to the other party’s
right to obtain the disclosure it is seeking by taking legal action.72

It took 16 years for the Supreme Court’s decision in Globe and Mail
to put an end to the doctrinal and jurisprudential debate regarding the
recognition of a journalist-source privilege in Quebec civil law.

V. THE MATTER OF GLOBE AND MAIL
1. The Facts
After the results of the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty, the
federal cabinet created the Sponsorship Program to counter the sovereignty movement and increase the federal government’s visibility in
Quebec. Based mainly on information received from a confidential
source, journalist Daniel Leblanc from The Globe and Mail (“the
Globe”) wrote a series of articles on the program. These articles reported
various dubious activities surrounding the program’s administration and
management. His most significant allegations targeted the misuse and
misdirection of public funds. Throughout the course of his communications with his source, whom he later identified as “MaChouette”, Daniel
Leblanc agreed to protect her confidentiality and anonymity.
The articles published by Daniel Leblanc and others who picked up
the story drummed up considerable media and public interest in the
Sponsorship Program. A scathing report from the Auditor General on the
federal government’s dubious management of the Sponsorship Program
as well as the “leaks” of privileged information to the press forced Paul
Martin, who was then Prime Minister, to order a commission of inquiry
into the Sponsorship Program, the highly publicized Gomery Inquiry, to
shed light on what had become known colloquially as the “Sponsorship
71
[1995] J.Q. no 2949, [1995] R.J.Q. 2440 (Que. S.C.). See also Landry v. Southam Inc.,
[2002] J.Q. no 9194 (Que. S.C.).
72
Tremblay v. Hamilton, id., at 2444 (translation).
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Scandal”. In 2006, Daniel Leblanc published a work entitled Nom de
code : MaChouette. L’enquête sur le scandale des commandites.73
In March 2005, the Attorney General of Canada brought proceedings
before the Superior Court of Quebec against several companies, including Groupe Polygone Éditeurs Inc., in order to recover the over $60
million that had been paid by the federal government under the contested
program.
The defendant Groupe Polygone advanced, among other things, a
defence of prescription to have the Attorney General’s claim dismissed,
alleging that the Canadian government knew of the scandal before 2002.
It argued that the action brought by the Attorney General of Canada was
statute-barred. At trial, and in support of its defence of prescription,
Groupe Polygone requested the court to order certain people, specifically
several employees of the federal government, to answer questions aimed
at identifying Daniel Lablanc’s secret source. In a series of orders, the
Superior Court instructed the individuals identified by Groupe Polygone
to answer the questions in writing and to keep the matter confidential.
When it received news of these orders, the Globe filed a motion for
revocation of the orders issued by the court along with a sworn statement
of the journalist maintaining that the orders violated Daniel Leblanc’s
and the Globe’s freedom of expression, which encompasses journalistsource privilege. Before the Superior Court, Daniel Leblanc testified that
the identity of his source, MaChouette, was confidential, and that a
relationship of trust based on anonymity had developed between them
over time. During the cross-examination led by Polygone’s attorney, the
Globe’s counsel raised objections to the many questions asked of Daniel
Leblanc, alleging that the questions were irrelevant and that answering
them would constitute a breach of the journalist-source privilege. The
trial judge dismissed these objections orally without any in-depth
analysis and refused to recognize the existence of the privilege.
Leave to appeal this decision was dismissed by a single judge of the
Court of Appeal on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction. Rather
than have its reporter answer the questions, the Globe tried to discontinue
its motion for revocation, but the trial judge refused and the Quebec
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of this decision. The Globe finally
appealed the Court of Appeal’s decision before the Supreme Court
of Canada.

73

(Montreal: Libre Expression, 2006).
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2. Allegations of the Parties
For the sake of this discussion, we provide the reader with a short
summary of the allegations of the main parties and interveners in Globe
and Mail: the Globe, Groupe Polygone, the Attorney General of Canada,
the Québec Federation of Professional Journalists and the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association.
(a) The Globe and Mail
Relying on foreign case law acknowledging a journalist-source privilege built over the foundations of constitutional protection afforded to
freedom of expression and its corollary, freedom of the press, the
appellant the Globe argued before the Supreme Court that a journalistsource privilege exists in Quebec law. It argued that there can be no
freedom of the press unless the confidentiality of journalists’ sources
receives maximum protection. Indeed, without the assurance of such a
protection, gathering controversial information that is already difficult to
access would become virtually impossible; the fear of being unmasked
and exposed to sanctions would discourage secret sources from disclosing certain information to journalists, thus creating a chilling effect. As
can be seen from a number of scandals revealed by investigative journalism in the United States, Europe and Canada, the disclosure of public
interest information to journalists by secret sources is crucial to safeguarding the press’s ability to gather information and, consequently, the
public’s right to access information.
According to the Globe, the right not to disclose the identity of a secret source stems from section 3 of the Quebec Charter in that it is a
corollary of the freedom of expression, but is not a full blanket protection. As is the case with any constitutional or quasi-constitutional
protection, it must be assessed and weighed to ensure that it is exercised
with “a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general
well-being of the citizens of Quebec”, as stipulated in section 9.1. of the
Quebec Charter.
The Globe argued that nothing prevents Quebec courts from applying the “Wigmore Doctrine”. Although it agreed with the general
principle of the autonomy of the civil law system, the rules of evidence
in Quebec reflect the mixed sources of Quebec civil law, which is greatly
influenced by principles inherited from the common law system.
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(b) Groupe Polygone
The respondent Groupe Polygone argued that there is no absolute
privilege in cases of communications between journalists and secret
sources.
First, the Constitution does not recognize any journalistic privilege.
The fundamental principles holding that no one is above the law and that
anyone can be compelled to disclose relevant information for the
purposes of justice are two arguments against recognizing a general
privilege. Testimonial immunity is the exception. The constitutional
principle of freedom of the press can, however, help the court strike a
balance among the interests at stake when determining if testimonial
immunity should apply to a particular case where protection of a source’s
confidentiality is invoked.
Polygone also maintained that the courts should use the “Wigmore
Doctrine” or a similar civil law test, specifying that it is up to the
journalist to show why protecting the source’s identity outweighs the
quest for truth.
According to Polygone, unless the journalist revealed the identity of
his or her source, it would be unable to present a full defence against the
government’s action.
(c) Attorney General of Canada
The respondent the Attorney General of Canada contended that the
issue in dispute must be resolved based solely on the rules of Quebec
civil law. It is the Civil Code that is the “jus commune” of Quebec and
governs, in harmony with the Quebec Charter, relations between individuals. This is why the Attorney General rejected the application of the
“Wigmore Doctrine” by the Quebec courts.
The Attorney General did not take a position on the final outcome of
the appeal, proposing instead an analysis of the civil law principles
applicable in Quebec respecting the privilege of excluding media
evidence.
At the very heart of the Attorney General’s presentation lies the argument that there is no hierarchy between freedom of expression,
freedom of the press, the right to an impartial hearing, the right to
privacy and the administration of justice. These rights are protected by
the Quebec Charter. The Attorney General of Canada maintained that
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such a right can only be recognized on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to
section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter.74
The Attorney General of Canada noted that, in Quebec civil matters,
the question of whether or not a journalist-source privilege exists
generally arises in defamation suits and can be resolved. The courts
generally try to strike a balance between freedom of the press and the
right of those being tried to obtain disclosure of evidence crucial to their
case. The Attorney General of Canada pointed out that the solution
adopted must take into consideration the ultimate purpose of a civil
action, namely, the quest for truth.
The Media Coalition75 argued that the Canadian Charter and the
Quebec Charter both protect freedom of the press through freedom of
expression. Case law has also recognized that the right to freely gather
information without undue restriction is a corollary of the freedom of the
press and is fundamental to news publishing.76 To preserve the vitality of
investigative journalism, journalists must be able to guarantee the
confidentiality of their sources so that they may gather the information
needed to publish news stories. Refusing to recognize this privilege
under these circumstances would have a disastrous effect on the vitality
of the press and, as a result, on democracy itself.
The Media Coalition also argued that the Canadian Charter and the
Quebec Charter applied to the case. In fact, it is not only the rights of the
journalist and parties involved in the dispute that are at issue here, but
freedom of expression and the public’s right to information.
Moreover, when the Canadian government itself is a party to the dispute and is directly involved in the examination of a journalist who is
being asked to reveal his or her source, such implication of governmental
authorities justifies in and of itself the application of the Canadian
Charter.

74

Quebec Charter, s. 9.1 provides:
In exercising his fundemental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of
Québec.
In this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limit to their exercise, may be
fixed by law.
75
The Media Coalition consisted of: The Quebec Federation of Professional Journalists, Ad
IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Astral Media Radio Inc., Groupe TVA inc., La Presse,
ltée, Médias Transcontinental Inc. and, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Christian Leblanc acted
as counsel for the Media Coalition in Globe and Mail.
76
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 SC.R. 421
(S.C.C.).
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The Media Coalition further argued that the “Wigmore Doctrine” is
not incompatible with Quebec law and must lead the case-by-case
analysis of the issue in dispute, under both the Canadian Charter and the
Quebec Charter. Hence, the suppletive role of common law in Quebec
civil law, and the application of the “Wigmore Doctrine”, has been
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Media Coalition also
pleaded that the Court has the power to create an independent privilege,
as was the case with the assertion of the police-informer privilege in
Quebec.
Furthermore, the Media Coalition contended that the “Wigmore Doctrine” should be amended by integrating the Dagenais/Mentuck test,77
which is used to determine whether a court should exercise its discretionary power to restrict freedom of expression and freedom of the press
in judicial proceedings. The Dagenais/Mentuck test, which is mechanically similar to the Oakes test,78 is a two-prong test and provides that a
publication ban may only be issued: (1) where it is necessary to prevent a
serious risk to the proper administration of justice, because reasonable
alternative measures will not prevent that risk; and (2) when the salutary
effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the
rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on
the right to freedom of expression, the right of the accused to a fair and
public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.
In this case, the Media Coalition showed that the first three factors of
the “Wigmore Doctrine”, adapted to the context of journalism, were met.
Consequently, communications between Leblanc and MaChouette were
transmitted confidentially with the assurance that MaChouette’s identity
would not be disclosed; the anonymity of this source is essential to the
preservation of the relationship; and the relationship between the
journalist and his source MaChouette was sedulously fostered. Under the
fourth factor of the Wigmore Doctrine, the Media Coalition argued that
Polygone must demonstrate that the necessity and benefit of disclosing
the source outweigh the deleterious effects on the right to freedom of
expression and the public’s right to information. The Globe’s objection to
the questions asked of the journalist Daniel Leblanc should therefore
have been sustained.

77

R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 at para. 32,

(S.C.C.).
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R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
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(d) Canadian Civil Liberties Association (“CCLA”)
Along with the Media Coalition, the CCLA argued that the right to
freely gather information is part of freedom of expression and freedom of
the press, and that confidential sources are an essential newsgathering
tool. The CCLA did not address the particular issue of the Quebec civil
law culture, however, pointing out that the Supreme Court of Canada
should adopt a uniform approach to journalist-source privilege.
According to the CCLA, a court order that would compel the disclosure of a confidential source violates section 2(b) of the Canadian
Charter and must be justified under section 1; in Quebec, such an order
violates section 3 of the Quebec Charter and must be justified under
section 9.1.
The CCLA argued that since the Wigmore test was not intended to
protect constitutional entitlements, it cannot safeguard Charter rights.
According to the CCLA, the Wigmore test is inadequate to protect
Charter rights, and therefore could not be used to determine whether or
not a judge should order the disclosure of a confidential source. The
CCLA therefore proposed a two-step test:
Step one: To establish a prima facie privilege the claimant must show
that (a) he or she is a journalist, (b) who is engaged in newsgathering,
and (c) acquired information in exchange for a promise of
confidentiality, and
Step two: Once a privilege is established, the burden shifts, and the
party seeking disclosure of a confidential newsgathering source must
justify the violation of a journalist-source privilege under the
Dagenais/Mentuck test.79

The CCLA’s test originates in the approach the association first presented to the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. National Post. The CCLA
argued that the proposed test should replace the common law Wigmore
test, and apply whenever a judge is asked to compel disclosure of a
confidential source.

79
See Globe and Mail, supra, note 2 (Factum of the Interveners) [hereinafter “CCLA’s Factum”]. See also online: <http://ccla.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/TOR01-4180878-v1CCLA_PrivilegeFactum_Final.pdf>.
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3. Reasons for Judgment
Picking up where it had left off in R. v. National Post,80 the Supreme
Court of Canada, led by LeBel J., concluded that journalistic sources are
protected in Quebec under civil law, and developed a clear test to
determine whether or not journalists are required to reveal the identity of
a secret source in disputes before a civil court.
(a) Legal Underpinnings of the Journalist-Source Privilege
First, the Supreme Court of Canada specified that the Quebec Charter applies in this dispute. Based on an analysis it had developed to assess
whether or not a journalist-source privilege exists and may apply in the
context of adducing documents or other physical evidence in a criminal
investigation process in a common law province, the Supreme Court
concluded that there is no quasi-constitutional basis for recognizing a
journalist-source privilege.81
As for the possibility of finding a quasi-constitutional basis under
section 3 of the Quebec Charter, the Supreme Court examined the similar
wording of section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter in R. v. National Post,
namely, use of the words “every person” much in the same way as
“everyone”. It is precisely because defining the group that would be
protected by quasi-constitutional immunity is so difficult (due, among
other reasons, to the heterogeneous nature of the group) that the Court
refuses to recognize a generic and quasi-constitutional privilege protecting the secrecy of journalists’ sources. The Court specified, however, that
the constitutional rights and values guaranteed under the Canadian
Charter and the quasi-constitutional rights guaranteed under the Quebec
Charter are engaged by claims of journalist-source privilege and must
therefore be considered in the analysis.82
As for the possibility of broadening the notion of professional secrecy to include communications between journalists and their secret
sources, the Court concluded that there is no basis for drawing an
analogy between professional secrecy and journalist-source privilege. In
fact, not only does section 9 of the Quebec Charter apply to the professions governed by the Professional Code, to which the profession of
journalism is not subject, the relationship between journalists and their
80
81
82

Supra, note 47.
Globe and Mail, supra, note 2, at para. 33.
Id.
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secret sources is not the type of relationship conceivably contemplated
by section 9 of the Quebec Charter.83 Indeed, Quebec doctrine identifies
two conditions that are crucial for recognizing relationships bound by
professional secrecy: (1) professions governed by the Professional Code;
and (2) an obligation of silence that is rooted in a relationship where the
beneficiary of the privilege seeks out the professional for help.84 The
Supreme Court concluded that the relationship between journalists and
their secret sources is not a helping relationship.
As to the possibility of section 44 of the Quebec Charter being a
source of a quasi-constitutional right, the Court believed that, while it is
true that the right to information favours the protection of confidential
relations between journalists and their sources, it cannot constitute the
basis for recognizing journalist-source privilege.85 Indeed, this privilege
is not a fundamental right, but belongs to a class of social and economic
rights.86
Since the Court concluded that a journalist-source privilege does not
exist under the Quebec Charter, it turned to the Quebec rules of procedural and evidentiary law set forth in the Civil Code and the C.C.P. in
order to determine whether it contained a basis for recognizing this right.
(b) Quebec, a Mixed Jurisdiction
Before beginning its analysis of testimonial privilege under Quebec
civil law, the Court first looked at the mixed sources of Quebec’s
procedural law. Globe and Mail thus gave the Supreme Court of Canada
an additional opportunity to recognize the mixed nature of Quebec civil
law, in this particular case, evidentiary law. In light of the mixed nature
of procedure and evidence in Quebec, and especially since the judiciary
system was greatly inspired by common law, the legal principles of
common law naturally play a suppletive role in the evolution of Quebec
procedural law. In the words of the Court, “Québec is, after all, a mixed
jurisdiction.”87
After discussing Lac d’Amiante,88 the Court emphasized that Quebec
courts do not enjoy the same freedom as their neighbouring common law
83
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provinces when it comes to ruling above and beyond the written codes
and legislation when they need to fill certain gaps or resolve certain
controversies.89 With regard to excluding evidence, Civil Code article 2858 is the only provision on which the discretionary power of a
judge may be based, and even then it is a discretion which remains
limited:
The court shall, even of its own motion, reject any evidence obtained
under such circumstances that fundamental rights and freedoms are
breached and that its use would tend to bring the administration of
justice into disrepute.
The latter criterion is not taken into account in the case of violation of
the right of professional privilege.

The Court, having already concluded that a journalist-source privilege is
not quasi-constitutional, concluded at this stage of the analysis that a
judge cannot exempt a journalist from testifying as to the identity of a
confidential source under this discretionary power.90 Aware of the
doctrinal and case law controversy surrounding the application of the
“Wigmore Doctrine” by Quebec courts, the Supreme Court insisted on
the residual role played by common law rules in the development of
evidentiary law.91 Given that a journalist-source privilege exists in
common law provinces, as confirmed by R. v. National Post, the Court
explained why the common law could play a role in clarifying Quebec
law on this issue.92 After stating that a mechanical incorporation of a
common law rule or principle should be avoided, the Court made clear
that any reliance on this law must comply with the overarching principles
set out in the Civil Code and the Quebec Charter.93 Justice LeBel
repeated that not everything on civil procedure is found in the C.C.P.,
leaving room for rules of practice. The Code of Civil Procedure, continued the Court, also allows tribunals to intervene on a case-by-case basis,
and confers the power to issue orders adapted to the particular context of
the cases of which they are apprised, specifically under articles 20 and 46
of the C.C.P.
89
Globe and Mail, id., at para. 47; see also Lac d’Amiante, id.; Société d’énergie Foster
Wheeler Co. v. Société intermunicipale de gestion et d’élimination des déchets (SIGED) inc., [2004]
S.C.J. No. 18, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.) (on the mixed sources of the notion of professional
secrecy under Quebec law).
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The Court thus confirmed that there is a basis in Quebec civil law for
recognizing a journalist-source privilege or an exemption from the
general obligation to give evidence in civil cases. The application of the
“Wigmore Doctrine” by Quebec courts in compliance with the overarching principles set out in the Civil Code and the Quebec Charter provides
an analytical framework for recognizing, on a case-by-case basis,
whether it is expedient to exempt journalists from answering questions
that would force them to disclose the identity of their sources.
(c) Application of the “Wigmore Doctrine” to the Journalist-Source
Privilege in Quebec Law
The Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning in this case is consistent
with Bisaillon v. Keable’s94 decision on the police-informer privilege
under Quebec law. In the Court’s opinion, this would be the best approach to adopt for journalists’ sources, given the similarity between the
outcomes of both measures. In Bisaillon v. Keable, the Supreme Court
ruled that because the origin of police-informer privilege is the common
law, the rule remained a part of Quebec law unless it was overturned by a
validly adopted statutory provision:
Unless overturned by validly adopted statutory provisions, these
common law rules must be applied in an inquiry into the administration
of justice, which is thus a matter of public law. Moreover, the point at
issue concerns the power to compel a witness to answer, by contempt
of court proceedings if necessary, the source for which is also the
common law.95

Therefore, in the absence of any rule to the contrary in the Civil Code or
C.C.P., Quebec courts are entirely justified in applying common law
rules.
Drawing inspiration from Beetz J.’s reasons in Bisaillon v. Keable
and taking R. v. National Post into account, the Court proposed a fourpronged analytical framework (inspired by the “Wigmore Doctrine”) for
recognizing a journalist-source privilege or an exemption from the
general obligation to provide evidence or testify in civil cases. To borrow
the words of LeBel J., “[d]espite its common law origins, the use of a
Wigmore-like framework to recognize the existence of case-by-case
94
95

[1983] S.C.J. No. 65, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 60 (S.C.C.).
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privilege in the criminal law context is equally relevant for civil litigation
matters subject to the laws of Québec.”96
Even if section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter and section 3 of the
Quebec Charter alone cannot be used as grounds for recognizing a
journalist-source privilege, it goes without saying that the values they
convey necessarily inform the analysis.97 The Court also mentioned the
powers granted to the Superior Court under article 46 of the C.C.P.,
which appears to provide judges with the authority needed to issue such
exemptions to journalists on a case-by-case basis.98 Consequently, the
Wigmore-like framework is not divorced from the rules of Quebec civil
law; quite the contrary, it reflects the rules’ principles and essence.
Before applying the four-pronged analytical framework to compel
journalists to answer questions likely to reveal the identity of a confidential source, the party seeking to reveal the identity of the source must first
demonstrate the relevance of the questions. The goal of this condition is
to ensure compliance with the evidentiary rules in Quebec civil law,
more specifically article 2857 of the Civil Code, which provides that
“[a]ll evidence of any fact relevant to a dispute is admissible and may be
presented by any means.” If relevance is not demonstrated, the analytical
framework need not be applied since the questions obviously will not be
allowed.
If the questions are deemed relevant, the four following factors are
applied:
(1) the relationship must originate in a confidence that the source’s
identity will not be disclosed;
(2) anonymity must be essential to the relationship in which the
communication arises;
(3) the relationship must be one that should be sedulously fostered in
the public interest; and
(4) the public interest served by protecting the identity of the informant
must outweigh the public interest in getting at the truth.99
The fourth factor of the analysis is the most important one, since the
court is called upon to strike a balance between (1) the importance of the
disclosure to the administration of justice; and (2) the public interest in
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preserving the confidentiality of the journalist’s source.100 The court must
weigh a certain number of elements, the list of which is not exhaustive,
before drawing its conclusion; these factors include what procedural
stage the case is at (examination in chief or discovery) and whether or
not the question is essential in the context of the dispute between the
parties (whether or not the journalist is part of the case).101 This exercise
of balancing the interests at hand requires the court to determine whether
the facts, information or evidence can be obtained by other means.
According to the Court:
If relevant information is available by other means and, therefore, could
be obtained without requiring a journalist to break the undertaking of
confidentiality, then those avenues ought to be exhausted. The
necessity requirement, like the earlier threshold requirement of
relevancy, acts as a further buffer against fishing expeditions and any
unnecessary interference with the work of the media. Requiring a
journalist to breach a confidentiality undertaking with a source should
be done only as a last resort.102

The analysis is thus carried out based on context, since what needs to
be determined is whether the journalist-source privilege should be
recognized in a particular case; the privilege is not generic. The court
will therefore evaluate the relevant elements of a situation as it presents
itself. It is up to the party invoking the privilege to demonstrate that the
interest of preserving the confidentiality of the journalist’s source
outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure.
The Court concluded its analysis with the following:
For example, at the far end of the spectrum, if Mr. Leblanc’s answers
were almost certain to identify MaChouette then, bearing in mind the
high societal interest in investigative journalism, it might be that he
could only be compelled to speak if his response was vital to the
integrity of the administration of justice.103

In our view, in light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court has established
a highly stringent criterion, precisely that it is only when it is “vital” to
the “integrity of the administration of justice” that a court will order a
journalist to answer a question that will entail the disclosure of the
identity of his or her source.
100
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(d) What about MaChouette?
Once again, here is a brief look at the context in which The Globe and
Mail invoked journalist-source privilege. Having been informed of the
orders issued by Hébert J. instructing the individuals identified by Groupe
Polygone Éditeurs Inc. to answer questions aimed at identifying Daniel
Leblanc’s secret source, The Globe and Mail presented a motion to revoke
the orders, arguing that the orders violated journalist-source privilege and
infringed the freedom of expression of Leblanc and The Globe and Mail.
During Groupe Polygone’s cross-examination, The Globe and Mail’s
lawyer objected to numerous questions on grounds that they were irrelevant and would breach journalist-source privilege. The trial judge dismissed these objections orally (without performing a complete analysis)
and refused to recognize the existence of that privilege.
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge committed an error
by reaching a hasty conclusion, orally at that, without weighing whether
that disclosure would be in the public interest. It held that Leblanc was
entitled to have the questions put to him challenged for relevancy.104 The
trial judge should have taken his claim seriously and performed the fourpronged analysis, based on the Wigmore Doctrine as proposed earlier, to
determine whether or not there was a journalist-source privilege in this
case.105 In the Court’s opinion:
if Grandpré J. concluded that the first three factors favoured disclosure,
he was then required to ask whether, on balance, the public interest in
maintaining journalist-source confidentiality outweighed the importance
of disclosure to the administration of justice.106

In this case, since the parties were not authorized to make comments or
adduce evidence on the issue of journalist-source privilege before the
Supreme Court of Canada, the latter chose to refer the matter to the
Superior Court for a new hearing as to whether the questions should be
put to the journalist Daniel Leblanc, in light of the four-pronged analytical framework developed by the Supreme Court.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Globe and Mail involves civil litigation, not the criminal investigative process. It involves testimonial compulsion, and not the production
of documents or other physical evidence. The parties’ dispute is subject
to the laws of Quebec. These elements make the case distinct from R. v.
National Post. However, in Globe and Mail, the Supreme Court of
Canada recognized that a journalist-source privilege exists under Quebec
civil law, putting an end to the controversy over whether the Wigmore
Doctrine can be applied under Quebec civil law. It thus completes the
analysis that began in R. v. National Post, in which the court recognized
a journalist-source privilege in the context of criminal proceedings
before a common law court. Globe and Mail therefore stands out as a
milestone Supreme Court of Canada decision that comes as a relief to the
media community across Canada, clarifying the protection of journalists’
sources, and providing investigative journalism with tools to properly
accomplish its goal.
The Supreme Court concluded that neither the Civil Code nor the
C.C.P. explicitly recognize a journalist-source privilege. Nor does the
Quebec Charter. Even so, the constitutional rights guaranteed under the
Canadian Charter and the quasi-constitutional rights guaranteed under
the Quebec Charter are engaged by a claim of journalist-source privilege.
That said, the Supreme Court strongly emphasized that the identity
of a confidential journalistic source may only be revealed “if his response was vital to the integrity of the administration of justice”.107
Quebec’s rules of procedure and evidence reflect the mixed sources
of Quebec civil law. Its procedural and evidentiary rules do not give
Quebec tribunals a discretionary power equal to that of the common law
tribunals in the rest of Canada when it comes to filling the existing gaps
in the law. When confronted with gaps in Quebec’s codified laws, it is
entirely appropriate that Quebec tribunals turn to common law rules,
which are one of the legal sources of Quebec civil law. If they believe
that transplanting a common law rule into Quebec civil law is warranted,
the courts must still respect the fundamental principle that the interpretation and articulation of such a rule would not otherwise be contrary to the
overarching principles set out in the Civil Code and the Quebec Charter.
In addition, the common law appears to recognize a journalist-source
privilege based on a Wigmore-like framework.
107
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The Supreme Court concluded that there is a foundation in Quebec
civil law supporting the recognition of a journalist-source privilege or an
exemption from the general obligation to provide evidence or testify in a
civil case. The application of the Wigmore Doctrine by Quebec courts, in
compliance with the overarching principles of the Civil Code and the
Quebec Charter, provides an analytical framework for determining
whether it is expedient, in a given case, to exempt journalists from
answering a question that would force them to identify their sources.
In Globe and Mail, the Supreme Court of Canada developed a clear
analytical framework for recognizing a journalist-source privilege on a
case-by-case basis. To compel journalists to answer questions likely to
reveal the identity of a confidential source, the courts must perform the
four-pronged analysis developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Globe and Mail, inspired by the “Wigmore Doctrine”. Once it is found
that the questions are relevant, journalists must answer whether: (1) the
relationship originated in a confidence that the source’s identity would
not be disclosed; (2) anonymity was essential to the relationship in which
the communication arose; (3) the relationship was one that was sedulously fostered in the public interest; and (4) the public interest that
would be served by protecting the identity of the informant outweighed
the public interest in getting at the truth.
By recognizing the existence of a journalist-source privilege under
Quebec civil law, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the central role
that investigative journalism plays in preserving a free and democratic
society. The confidentiality of journalists’ sources is a crucial factor
allowing journalists to obtain unfettered public interest information and
to continue to play a key role in monitoring public and democratic
institutions.

